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Introduction
Following debates about the crisis of representation makes somebody who is
thinking about non-Western – if you allow me to cut a very complex discussion
very short – ways of living in modern contexts feel uneasy. For us, it sounds like
talking about “the crisis of liberal democracy” in the West1 – and leaving out the
discussions about the #rest! – still claiming the West as representing the universal
situation. Esp., discussions like these tend to ignore the intimate relation of au-
thoritarian regimes securing the survival of the liberal democracies and thus
creating a global crisis.
We will argue in the following that the global crisis is just the cause of the
backlash against liberal democracy supported by a global system that is not based
on the principles of liberal democracy. The role of Saudi Arabia is the case study
wewill discuss. But let us turn at first to the idea of representation as understood in
these lines.
1 CarlRaschke,Force ofGod: Political Theology and theCrisis ofLiberalDemocracy,
New York/Chichester: Columbia University Press 2015.
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1. Critique of Representation
The concept of representation and its critique of Deleuze opens up new di-
mensions of thinking about representation, creates a new logic.AsHenry Somers-
Hall puts it:
“[W]e sawhowDeleuze attempts to introduce this concept of a difference that is not to be
understood in terms of negation through the resort to new geometries, and in particular,
geometries that are grounded in the differential calculus. In doing so, he attempted to
provide uswith a new logic, one that operates outside of the categories of representation”
allowing “Deleuze to escape from the dialectical reduction of the beyond to appearance.
Deleuze tries to achieve this through defining a third way between the two options that
Hegel puts forward.On the one hand, difference is not the same as it is for immediate law,
so it does not collapse into appearance immediately. On the other hand, it is not the
difference of the inverted world, which is a difference taken to the level of opposition, so
it is not open to reconciliation through contradiction. What defines this new approach,
according to Deleuze, is that it proposes a new set of relations among the concepts of
limitation, determination, and negation.”2
Which way to follow to get out of the immanent problems of representation
leaving “the categories of representation”? Following again Somers-Hall we may
say:
“Deleuze […] attempts to overturn the structure of judgment […]. Rather than recon-
ceiving difference and identity through the infinitization of representation, Deleuze cir-
cumscribes a domain of representation, pure actuality, paralleling Kant!s distinction be-
tween the phenomenal and the noumenal. Just as Kant shows that the notion of world
cannot without be formulated, Deleuze shows that representational actuality requires the
supplement of a non representational moment, the virtual.While the supplement inKant!s
transcendental idealism is purely negatively determined, the noumenon as limit case,
Deleuze develops a notion of virtuality that is positive and contentful. The limitations of
judgment, therefore, point to the necessity of a moment that cannot be captured by the
structureof judgment, just asBergson!s notionof intuitionpoints toanonspatial conception
of time. Rather than extending representation to the point where it overcomes its limi-
tations, Deleuze argues that totalized representation is a form of transcendental illusion,
generated by a failure to analyze the genesis of the structure of judgment. Judgment is not
merely incomplete, therefore, but is a false approach to the world, once it is severed from
these genetic conditions. Without a recognition of a moment outside of representation, we
are forced to conceive of difference in terms of the negation of a certain structure of
judgment, for instance, rather than as a positive term in its own right. […] It also allows us to
explain why within finite representation there can be no specification of a principle of
division: representation!s genetic conditions are subrepresentational.
2 Henry Somers-Hall, Hegel, Deleuze, and the Critique of Representation. Dialectics
of Negation and Difference, Albany, NY: SUNY Press 2012, p. 203.
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Deleuze!s response to representation therefore also keeps in play both identity and
difference. Rather than reconciling these two moments on the same ontological plane
through a notion of contradiction, however,Deleuze separates difference and identity by
making difference a transcendental condition of identity itself. Identity is grounded in the
non-identical.”3
According to Somers-Hall we may say that changing the plane of the tran-
scendental illusion of totalized representation to the plane of immanence that is
understood as a
“spatial flatnesss like that of a beach with its open horizon allowing Deleuze to coin the
notion of the plane of immanence and refer it, esp., to Spinoza.Deleuze comes across this
plane of immanence by the attempt to understand Spinoza from his center. Leaving the
first and foremost principle of Spinoza aside hewants to turn towhole series of principles:
There is one substance for all modi but beyond that there is only one nature for all
individuals or bodies and this nature itself again is an individual in its continuous var-
iation, a singular and collective body constantly transforming itself in infinite ways.”4
This plane of immanence is “a plane of swarming difference and not full of dif-
ference.”5 Bearing this in mind, we may say, a way out of the problems of repre-
sentation may be found in this Deleuzian understanding that prefers the turn to
the nonidentical avoiding the creation of a position of judgement, subduing the
other in a totalized representation, and leading to a hierarchical construction of
the world.
Since the importance of the position of judgement in Deleuze may not be
understood, some remarks are necessary. As Deleuze wrote in his book on Ex-
pressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza:
“It follows that nobody has the authority to decide my rights. Everyone in the state of
nature, whetherwiseman or fool, judgeswhat is good or bad, andwhat is necessary for his
preservation.Whence natural right is not opposed #to strifes, hatred, anger, treachery, or,
in general, anything that appetite suggests.! And if comes about that we are lead to
renounce our natural right, this will not happen through the recognition of the wiseman!s
authority, but fromour own consent to this authority, from fear of a greater evil or hope of
a greater good.”6
3 Ibid., p. 242.
4 Christoph Dittrich, Weder Herr noch Knecht: Deleuzes Spinoza-Lektüren, Wien/
Berlin: Turia+Kant 2012, pp. 56–57.
5 Ibid.
6 Gilles Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, New York: Zone Books
1990, p. 260; cf. ibid., pp. 258–259 for the context of a Hobbesian understanding of nat-
ural law. As a remark concerning the Saudi case study below: We have to stress that this
understanding ofDeleuzian concepts avoids the shortcomings of the reductionist reading
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The acceptance of the “wiseman”, the judge,means to leave the plane of immance
and producing again the old idea of representation creating hierarchies and ex-
cluding non-European, non-civilized humans (see below). Only a new logic be-
yond this #old! logic of representation (and, e. g., its Hegelian critique) will lead us
out of the present impasse.7 Leaving the non-identical and non-representantional
aside means an inability to understand the claim of Western representation as
representing the universal as a claim of negating difference. This will lead to an
ever-growing exclusion of humanity defined as non-European. Being non-Eu-
ropean means being the object of violence in European wars and denied the
hallowed principles of human rights understood as the core principles of liberal
democracy. The crisis of liberal democracy means the disclosure of the real-life
fundamentals of modern liberal democracy at a global level for the majority of
humans globally, fundamentals that include non-representational powers (see
below) acting as representatives of liberal representation.8
To understand the results of this exclusion of non-Europeans and them being
subjected to violence we have to introduce another concept following a critical
reading the #old! logic of representation referring to a specific case study.
2. Aerial Bombing, Democracy, and its Web of Preconditions
Having said this, we would like to turn to an issue unlikely to be discussed in a
context like this: aerial bombing. Talking about it may help us to conceptualize
better the phenomena I want to talk about critically referring to SaudiArabia and
representation. The critical dimension of the rhizomatic conceptualization con-
necting these real-life facts is to be found in the Saudi bombs killing of thousands
and thousands of Yemeni men and women.9 This is to be discussed in terms of
of Foucault by Said.We are not writing in the tradition of a critique of Orientalist or neo-
Orientalist positions.We are far beyond this very limited debate. The same holds true for
any discussion of aspects of international law.
7 We may think, e. g., of an extraversion in the sense of Victor Segalen to conceptu-
alize a European non-Eurocentric view added to a Deleuzian approach as a way out.
8 For those who are not able to understand: It is a play of words.We apologize for this
infringement of etiquette of German academic style of writing.
9 We have to bear in mind that a war in Yemen was foreshadowing the decline of
another power in the MENA region: Egypt (see W. Andrew Terrill, “The Chemical
Warfare Legacy of the Yemen War”, in: Comparative Strategy 10ii (1991), pp. 109–119
and, e.g., Jesse Ferris, Nasser!s Gamble: How the Intervention Caused the Six-Day-War
and the Decline of Egyptian Power, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 2013). For
the recent war in Yemen (and against the Yemeni People)MayDarwich, “Machtprestige
als Motiv des saudischen Krieges im Jemen”, in: GIGA focus nahost 6/2015, pp. 1–8,
Zachary Laub,Yemen in Crisis, April 19, 2016; for the present situation seeHolly Ellyatt,
Saudi Arabia and Iran!s Feud has entered a new "unpredictable! phase.
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international law, but in the framework we developed before: the exclusion of
humans from the liberal order of representation.
Why talking about aerial bombing as a phenomenon interrelated to repre-
sentation this way? We have to approach in an unconventional manner: There is
an important transition in the 19th century from personal/governmental wars to
national wars; the “lev*e en masse” springs up to our mind.
In the laws of war, there are during the nineteenth century,
“two, partly contradictory, developments. On the one hand, the citizens are increasingly
mobilized for military duties, and compulsory military service is being instituted. The
armed forces and the nation, in other words, tend to merge. On the other hand, however,
international law is being set up in order to protect non-combatant immunity, and thus to
establish legally that unarmed civilians and armed combatants have to be treated dif-
ferently. On the one hand, conscription tends to assimilate all citizens to the nation-state
and its apparatus of violence, but, on the other hand, international law forbids private
citizens being treated as representatives of their countries or states.”10
The negation of representation mentioned by Hippler is the secret history of
Western modernity.11 But:
“To the extent to which the limitation of warfare within Europe relied on the common
ground of similar social organization and a shared civilization, the non-European #others!
were excluded from this habitual settlement and equally from codified international law.
Hence, the practice of colonial war has always been very different from the limited forms
of warfare that were, at least in principle, applied in Europe. Outside the European
centre, the civilian populations have never been considered as having a right to protection
from military action.”12
Deliberately targeting civilian populationswas part and parcel of colonial warfare
producing ideas that were later on used on European civilians. Targeting of ci-
vilians – who are not perceived as civilians – has a long history in colonial warfare.
In his Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice, British Colonel C. E. Callwell
wrote – quoting a South African13 experience – in 189614 that a #real war!
10 Thomas Hippler, Bombing the People: Giulio Douhet and the Foundation of
Air Power Strategy, 1884–1939, Cambridge et al. : Cambridge University Press 2013,
p. 11 seqq.
11 For thosewho are not able to understand:Weare arguing at the plane of immanence
(see above).
12 Ibid., p. 8.
13 South Africa is a case at hand when thinking about Africans and Afrikaners as
people living in Africa and as such: non-Europeans and the British against them as
paradigmatic colonial wars.
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“may be terminated by the surrender or capitulation of the hostile sovereign or chief, who
answers for his people; but in the suppression of a rebellion the refractory subjects of the
ruling power must all be chastised and subdued… the main points of difference between
small wars and regular campaigns … are that, in the former, the beating of the hostile
armies is not necessarily the main object even if they exist, that effect on morale is often
far more important than material success, and that the operations are sometimes limited
to committing havoc which the laws of regular warfare do not sanction.”15
There is also a long history of attacking civilian population by naval attacks that
have been taken over by the emerging airforces.16 After WW1 military theorists
conceptualized attacks by aircrafts as the first wave of attacks in a new war. The
people shaping these new strategies were deeply influenced by their experiences
in colonial warfare. And is not surprising that the first aerial bombingwas done by
an Italian pilot fighting Arab/Muslims #rebels! against Italian colonialism in 1911.
At the same time the new air force was imagined, e.g., by the famous Italian
theoretician of air wars, Giorgio Douhet, paradoxically a pacifist, as a means to
end thewars, to control the enemies of a global peace among the – civilized – states
– not the barbarous, uncivilized people everywhere else.
As we heard from Calwell, the decision is up to “the sovereign/chief,” no
representation is needed, it is only at the moral level that indirectly an indirect
influence by his subjects may be exerted on “the sovereign/chief” to capitulate.
The native population is constructed as an intermediary no laws of – civilized –
warfare applies to a group not to be represented or representing. So a civilized
way of representation even if a ruler-subject structure is conceded to the people
who are fought by the civilized armies in a non-civilized manner, but it is still a
“subrepresentational” representation.
The dichotomy civilization vs. non-civilization exerts influence into European
discussions after WW1 when another non-civilized enemy appeared in Europe:
the working class uprising after the victory or defeat of the old powers conceived
as endangering liberal democracy. In this case, the airpower theoreticians re-
flected upon the need to quell these uprisings by using airplanes in different ways,
workers. Male and female, being seen as an un-civilized mass, a threat to civi-
lization. As such they are amalgamated with the other non-civilized forces, the
colonialized people fighting for their independence.
Another aspect: Thinking of the conscription as a process of assimilating the
population into the nation-state, the distinction between representatives and
represented disappears. The population becomes a legitimate target of aerial
attacks as workforce supporting the military efforts, as supporters of the gov-
14 Charles E. Callwell, Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice, London: H.M.S.O
19063.
15 Ibid., pp. 41–42.
16 See for this and the following remarks Hippler, Bombing.
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ernmental politics whosemoral may be attacked to destroy their support, another
way of putting “civilized” Europeans at the same level as “non-civilized” colo-
nialized people.17
Colonial warfare creeps into European warfare, a bitter irony we may call it.
Representation may be the wrong term to discuss these developments, or we
might say representation is only applicable to people that are not subjected to
Europeanwarfare – be theyEuropean or not. Not allowing representation to non-
Europeans lead to non-representation of Europeans.18 We will look into a non-
European case study! Saudi-Arabia and theWahhabi definition of Islam provide
us with a case at hand beyond the simple of fact of Saudi (and allied) aircrafts are
bombing non-Europeans as European and US aircrafts did before.
3. Wahhabism & Saudi-Arabia
Turning to religion, we may see another non-representative representation19
being part of representation liberal democracy style. A brief sketch what the
religious variety in Saudi Arabia means in Saudi Arabia, at an Arabic level and a
global level may be helpful. To begin with, we have stated that there are some
limitations to a thorough understanding of the transformations taking place in
Islamic communities since the sixteenth century by many observers. We may,
however, discern some trends that are characteristic for this period20 :
1) Islamhas to become a religion, turning away from the fluid, complex, and even
contradictory ways to interact with the revelation starting from a pre-text (or
some pre-texts), be it theological, philosophical, natural philosophy, art,
music, poetry, mysticism etc.;
2) this new religion of Islam has to produce claims of validity or truth projects for
the social order of the communities competing with other – older – claims.
Esp., the claims have to be understood as the basis for a new complex set of
rules for the way of ruling and the way of public behavior;
3) a new political community, i. e., a state, emerges as the basis of this Islam,
theology becoming political;21
17 This will be important for the discussion of the Saudi aerial bombing.
18 When non-Europeans defended themselves successfully again European armies it
was worse. E.g., think of the “savage” Mahdi followers in Sudan or the “Mad Mullahs”
etc. We can!t follow this line of thought.
19 For those who are not able to understand: This is to read as an ironic remark.
20 We refer to Reinhard Schulze, Geschichte der islamischen Welt: Von 1900 bis zur
Gegenwart, München: C. H. Beck 2016 and Shahab Ahmad, What is Islam? The Im-
portance of Being Islamic, Princeton, NJ / Oxford: Princeton University Press 2016.
21 For interesting reflections on the relations of religion, theology, and the political see
Wolfgang Palaver et al. (eds.), Politische Philosophie versus Politische Theologie? Die
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4) a new understanding of the Islamic sources, distancing itself from other tra-
ditions regarded as non-religious;
5) general rules of conduct of the individuals are transformed general, binding
standards for the community;
6) at least one group or community of Muslims agrees on these standards;
7) this group/community (jama!a)22 raises a claim to rule.
This community pretends to be the direct expression of the will of the Muslim
community at large or the unmediated realization of God!s will on earth. We
might say these movements (including Wahhabism) claim a representation
without representing anyone but God.
The transformation movement at the Arabian Peninsula that became the
dominant religious tendency is usually calledWahhabism. This tendency emerged
in the 18th century as part of the larger movements of transformation in the
Islamic world.23 For us it may be interesting that the adherents of Wahhabism
called themselves, e.g., “professors of the oneness of God” (muwahhidun) or just
“Muslims” (muslimun) claiming as such to be the true incarnation of Islam and
Muslims negating the possibility of mediating authorities between god and the
believers, that existed before and still continued to exist. And it destroyed the
seeds of an emerging representative process, e.g., a modernized, reformed Islam,
be it modernist or traditionalist, in the wake of modern forms of globalization. So
we talk – based on historical evidence – of a non-representational form of Islam
eradicating every of pre-modern intermediation and representation.
This non-representational Islam is discernible if we look into the basic theo-
logical tenets of the exclusivist forms of Islam like Wahhabism. Starting with
tawhid, the profession that there is only one god, a second tenet is the interdiction
of adding an object of worship to God. A third one is the need to dissociate from
anybodywho is not accepted as a trueMuslim and the associationwho are not true
Muslims. A very elaborate theology of hell is enforcing these attitudes. Strict
condemnation of any other ways of being Muslim is another aspect of this the-
ology of exclusivism claiming to be the only way of relating to god islamically.24
Frage der Gewalt im Spannungsfeld von Politik und Religion, Innsbruck: Innsbruck
University Press 2011.
22 See for the idea of community Rüdiger Lohlker, “Jama¯!a vs. Mulk: Community-
centered and ruler-centered visions of the Islamic community”, in: Eirik Hovden et al.
(eds.), Meanings of Community across Medieval Eurasia, Leiden/Boston: Brill 2016,
pp. 78–96.
23 Rüdiger Lohlker, Islam: Eine Ideengeschichte, Wien: facultas/wuv 2008, pp. 173seqq.
24 For exclusivism as a concept for the phenomena discussed here see Rüdiger
Lohlker, “Excluding theOther:Wahhabism, Salafism, Jihadism, and Political Islam”, in:
Totalitarismus und Demokratie 14ii (2017), pp. 265–289.
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It is well known Wahhabi Islam depends on the support of the Saudi ruling
family and vice versa, the rulers turned the servants of Islam being entitled to use
religion for their own ends. This connects the Saudi-Wahhabi polity to the glo-
balized petrol-economy since the 1930s and as such being part of the societies that
became the epitome of liberal democracies at first economically. From this
starting point, the economic influence of Saudi-Arabia crept into world economy,
esp., in the so-called liberal democracies and after the 1970s. Seen, full of re-
sentment by Western media, e.g., in the figure of the #Arab sheik! attacking the
resources of the Western world during the so-called oil crisis 1973. The intricate
relations of Saudi (and other Arab) investments and #Western! interests would
deserve a thorough discussion that cannot be done here. But for our purpose, we
may say – without turning toMarxist arguments – these economic dimensions are
another “subrepresentational” aspect of global Saudi influence.
Since the 1960s another process begins. Feeling threatened by the mounting
influence of Nasserist Arab Socialism (and other varieties of Arab nationalism),
the Saudi government established a body of scholars of Wahhabi scholars and
non-Wahhabi scholars, the Islamic World League.25 The main function was the
propaganda for the true Islam, i. e. , Wahhabi Islam, at a global level. This global
propaganda effort deeply transformed the structure –material andmental – of the
global Islamic community, the umma, into an Islamicmodernity influenced by the
structures of Wahhabi (and Salafi Islam, partly an offspring of Wahhabism). The
umma is conceived as a global nation-state of Islam, the leading power of con-
temporary Islam – in their perceptions – the Saudis/Wahhabis, have the right to
speak for – another form of non-representational representation legitimated by
power and economical means. This is furthered by the establishment of the Is-
lamic University of Medina, giving students worldwide an opportunity to study
Islam Wahhabi style. The alumni of this university form another network
spreading the Wahhabi and Salafi brand of Islam.26 Another element is sending
missionaries everywhere, promoting mosques and Islamic centers (often funded
by the Saudi dominated Islamic World League), producing and disseminating
copies of the Quran, activities aiming at the acquisition of symbolic or religious
capital. These activities are truly globalized using every means of communication
available.27
We will not talk about the involvement of Saudi-Arabian nationals and of
Saudi funding into the Jihadi movements worldwide. But there is another inter-
25 Rüdiger Lohlker, Die Salafisten: Der Aufstand der Frommen, Saudi-Arabien und
der Islam, München: C. H. Beck 2017, pp. 106–108.
26 See Lohlker, Die Salafisten, pp. 110–111.
27 See the chapters on Saudi Arabia in Lohlker, Die Salafisten. A treasure trove of
information on the globalized aspect of Wahhabism (and Saudi Arabia) is to be found at
“Saudi Cables”. Internet source: The Saudi Cables. Cables and other documents from the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
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esting fact. Jihadis are threatening, e. g., the voters inUS elections28, do not accept
any distinction between governments, security forces, and civilians, all of them
legitimate targets of Jihadi attacks. Structurally speaking this can be seen as a
parallel to the justification for attacks of civilians in wartime by nation states.
Terrorists claiming statehood on another level, too, and doing another step of
integration into the globalized world. In this respect acting very similar to their
Saudi-Wahhabi relatives, threatening the very act of representation.
Turning to the example of the war in Yemen this gets another meaning: it is a
punitive war against rebels, i. e. , criminal violating the hallowed principle of Saudi
dominance at the Arab Peninsula and, coming back to religion, challenging an-
other principle: the subordinate status of Shiite people in the same region, since
the sole representation of Islam accepted is the representation by the true Mus-
lims, i. e., Wahhabis. People not accepting are judged as being criminals, to be
eradicated from earth not to be represented by any/body.As to the Shiites this can
be easily detected by the sayings of Wahhabi scholars supporting the alternative
for Shiites: conversion toWahhabi Islam or complete eradication.29 This does not
allow for any representation at all, since no sovereign/judge/mediator for Yemeni
Shiites is accepted.
Any representation disappearing in the havoc of a totalized warfare has far-
reaching effects: a non-representative representation of being – true – Muslim
overtly declares its willingness to act as a terrorist entity following the modern
policy of the colonial police bombings. And – as a logical consequence – this way
of great/small warfare is supported by many liberal democracies that are #liberal!
at home.Another element of this kind of cohabitation is the conspicuous way Iran
– as the important regional competitor of Saudi Arabia – is described as a global
evil or criminal not to be treated as a national state like others linking the interest
of global powers to regional powers to a totalized religious system cutting out any
method of mediation.
This can be read “as a result of internal tensions in representation!s organ-
izational structure, whatDeleuze calls the #catastrophes! […] of representation.”30
It is evident why it seems legitimate to describe Saudi Arabia as “an ISIS that
has made it”31, as Kamal Daoud, the Algerian writer, puts it, using the same
terrorist practice and denial of the right to exist for anybody who does not follow
the same theology of violence as jihadists do.
If we think of representation as the only face of liberal democracy,we should be
reminded that there is another face, less attractive but part of the same head
becoming visible in the age of globalization. Globalization, we have been told,
28 There are many files online illustrating these threats.
29 Lohlker, Die Salafisten, p. 131.
30 Somers-Hall, Hegel, Deleuze. p. 35.
31 Kamel Daoud, “Saudi Arabia, an ISIS That HasMade It”, in:TheNewYork Times,
November 20th, 2015.
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includes a fading away of nation-states and the emergence of a #global culture!32
but the exemplum of the aerial war tells another story:
“At the same time, however, strategic bombing already looks beyond the national hori-
zon ofwar. The essential weakness of the concept of national war is the fact that it tends to
take the nation as a given unity. Sovereignty had formerly been conceptualized as em-
anating from the person of the monarch: the further removed from themonarch!s vision,
the more sovereignty became diluted. This is why it has been said that #real! sovereignty
was invented by the emerging national state during the time of the French Revolution.
This #real! sovereignty – popular sovereignty – replaces the absent vision of the monarch
with the omnipresent vision of the panopticon. The nation as a whole becomes the realm
of sovereignty. Nation, state, and sovereignty are the same, but this sovereign national
state is conceived on the model of monarchical sovereignty, as a unity. But at the same
time, it is evident that bombing strategies allow the inevitable fragility of this unity: hence
strategic bombing relies on the idea that it can be undone; centres of political decision-
making can be #beheaded,! and workers can be induced to rebel against their govern-
ments. If the state apparatuses no longer function and become unable to protect citizens
from being targeted, national unity will fade away into anarchy and civil war. In other
words, the nation is unstable in itself, and beneath national unity lurks the threat of civil
war.”33
That a nation-state is unstable in itself is demonstrated by the Saudi-led coalition
and its US- and other supporters destroying the Yemeni nation state as a moral
lesson for everybody aiming at a dissolution of the nation-state of KSA and
creating a situation a civil war may occur in Saudi Arabia itself.
But there is more to it: Looking beyond the horizon of the national states from
another angle wemay see states cummovements like Saudi-Arabia, we see a truly
globalized world-view transcending any national state and privileging a religious
framework for understanding the global system, claiming to be dominated by a
kind of true Islam embodied in the KSAwith a global outreach.
This political aspect is strengthened by the support of an economical and po-
litico-military power by other global powers, ignoring the religio-theological
realm established by the Wahhabi-Salafi influence as a collateral damage that is
justified by the overwhelming gains to be earned, be it economic34 or military/
political.
32 For a critical view see Subhabrata Bobby Banerjee / Stephen Linstead, “Global-
ization, Multiculturalism and other Fictions: Colonialism for the New Millenium?”, in:
Organization 8iv (2001), pp. 683–722.
33 Hippler, Bombing, pp. 258seq.
34 For insights into the Saudi economy see Mohamed A. Ramady, The Saudi Arabian
Economy: Policies, Achievements, and Challenges, New York et al.: Springer 20102 and
Tim Niblock / Monica Malik, The Political Economy of Saudi Arabia, London / New
York: Routledge 2007.
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Thismay best be illustrated by themeeting on February 14, 1945 on board of an
American warship of President Franklin D. Roosevelt and King Abdul Aziz ibn
Saud shaping the future of the MENA region.35 The US-president accepting the
important role of the Saudi ruling family and implicitly the truth claims of Wah-
habi clerics for the Arab and Islamic world; the king supporting the role of the
USA in the region.
The justification to be – not to represent! – true Islammay be based on spurious
grounds looking at the globalized actions of the offspring of Wahhabi-Salafism I
would like to call Jihadism. It is a competition between two varieties of exclusivist
Islamboth claiming to be the legitimate heirs of theWahhabimovement emerging
in the eighteenth century. The Jihadi one focussing on the use of violence as its
main characteristic, the Saudi one drawing legitimacy from its relation to theKSA
and its rulers. Both of them are acting and thinking globalized. The Jihadi one
fighting a global war, the Saudi one building institutional and investment net-
works; sometimes both forms of exclusivism are overlapping. In a wider com-
parative view we may be reminded of another phenomenon of illegal activities,
global organized crime, ignored in the usual way of conceptualizing representa-
tion and globalization often connected to Jihadism.36 That is another line we
cannot follow here.
Conclusion
To summarize the picture of globalized representation/non-representation, we
may say liberal democracies and its ideas of representation are not as universal as
they try to project it. On a theoretical level it is easy to demonstrate that the claims
of representation are not successful. Theoretically speaking, looking into the
hidden face of liberal demonstration reveals that this conceptualization of rep-
resentation means the permanent exclusion of #non-civilized!, #non-represented!
sectors of humanity.
There are other sectors of contemporary world society that are supported by
states claiming #civilized! representation. The case study discussed here is Saudi-
Arabia, a paradigm of a unique view of Islam cutting off any link to the var-
iantology of Islamic history, a possible source for constructing another form of
35 See Thomas W. Lippman, “The Day FDR met Saudi Arabia!s Ibn Sa!ud”, in: The
Link 38ii (2005) for a vivid account of this meeting.
36 See one of the few studies available Aisha Ahmad, Jihad & Co.: BlackMarkets and
Islamist Power, Oxford et al.: Oxford University Press 2017. On the need for further
research in this field see Rüdiger Lohlker / Amr El Hadad / Philipp Holtmann / Nico
Prucha: “Transnationale Welten”, in: Janusz Biene et al. (ed.): Salafismus und Dschi-
hadismus in Deutschland: Ursachen, Dynamiken, Handlungsempfehlungen, Frankfurt a.
M.: Campus 2016, pp. 199–232.
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representation than the dominant one. Thus the representation conventional style
is built on a system of non-representation claiming the representation of non-
difference. This affects all aspects of representation – Western style.
This is the truemeaning and the hidden face of the admiration of dictators who
seem to guarantee or have guaranteed order and security – as long as they comply
with the interests of the liberal democracies. Fitting well into the construction of
and the judgement on the nature of the Other.
Reflecting this difference by using ideas of Deleuze helps to rethink conven-
tional ideas of representation and deconstructing the hierarchical structure in-
herent in these ideas of representation.
References
Ahmad, Aisha: Jihad & Co.: Black Markets and Islamist Power, Oxford et al. , Oxford
University Press 2017.
Ahmad, Shahab: What is Islam? The Importance of Being Islamic, Princeton, NJ / Ox-
ford, Princeton University Press 2016.
Banerjee, Subhabrata Bobby / Linstead, Stephen: “Globalization, Multiculturalism and
other Fictions: Colonialism for the New Millenium?”, in: Organization 8iv (2001),
pp. 683–722.
Callwell, Charles E.: Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice, London, H.M.S.O 19063.
Deleuze, Gilles: Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, New York: Zone Books 1990.
Dittrich, Christoph:Weder Herr noch Knecht: Deleuzes Spinoza-Lektüren, Wien/Berlin,
Turia und Kant 2012.
Ferris, Jesse: Nasser!s Gamble: How the Intervention Caused the Six-Day-War and the
Decline of Egyptian Power, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press 2013.
Hippler, Thomas: Bombing the People: Giulio Douhet and the Foundation of Air Power
Strategy, 1884–1939, Cambridge et al., Cambridge University Press 2013.
Lohlker, Rüdiger: Die Salafisten: Der Aufstand der Frommen, Saudi-Arabien und der
Islam, München, C. H. Beck 2017.
Lohlker, Rüdiger: “Excluding the Other: Wahhabism, Salafism, Jihadism, and Political
Islam”, in: Totalitarismus und Demokratie 14ii (2017), pp. 265–289.
Lohlker, Rüdiger: Islam: Eine Ideengeschichte, Wien: facultas/wuv 2008.
Lohlker, Rüdiger: “Jama¯!a vs. Mulk: Community-centered and ruler-centered visions of
the Islamic community”, in: EirikHovden et al. (eds.),Meanings of Community across
Medieval Eurasia, Leiden / Boston, Brill 2016, pp. 78–96.
Lohlker, Rüdiger / El Hadad, Amr / Holtmann, Philipp / Prucha, Nico: “Transnationale
Welten”, in: Janusz Biene et al. (ed.): Salafismus und Dschihadismus in Deutschland:
Ursachen, Dynamiken, Handlungsempfehlungen, Frankfurt a. M.: Campus 2016,
pp. 199–232.
Niblock, Tim / Malik, Monica: The Political Economy of Saudi Arabia, London / New
York, Routledge 2007.
122
Rüdiger Lohlker
Interdisciplinary Journal for Religion and Transformation (2018), Heft 7, doi.org/10.14220/jrat.2018.4.issue-2
Open-Access-Publikation im Sinne der CC-Lizenz BY-NC-ND 4.0 
(https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/)
Palaver, Wolfgang et al. (eds.): Politische Philosophie versus Politische Theologie? Die
Frage der Gewalt im Spannungsfeld von Politik und Religion, Innsbruck, Innsbruck
University Press 2011.
Ramady, Mohamed A.: The Saudi Arabian Economy: Policies, Achievements, and
Challenges, New York et al. , Springer 20102.
Raschke, Carl: Force of God: Political Theology and the Crisis of Liberal Democracy,
New York / Chichester, Columbia University Press 2015.
Schulze, Reinhard: Geschichte der islamischen Welt: Von 1900 bis zur Gegenwart,
München, C. H. Beck 2016.
Somers-Hall, Henry: Hegel, Deleuze, and the Critique of Representation. Dialectics of
Negation and Difference, Albany, NY, SUNY Press 2012.
Terrill,W.Andrew: “The ChemicalWarfare Legacy of theYemenWar”, in:Comparative
Strategy 10ii (1991).
Internet Sources
Daoud, Kamel: “Saudi Arabia, an ISIS That Has Made It”, in: The New York Times,
November 20th, 2015, available here: https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/21/opinion/
saudi-arabia-an-isis-that-has-made-it.html [September 9th, 2018].
Darwich, May: “Machtprestige als Motiv des saudischen Krieges im Jemen”, in: GIGA
focus nahost 6/2015, pp. 1–8, available here: https://www.giga-hamburg.de/de/pub
lication/machtprestige-als-motiv-des-saudischen-krieges-im-jemen [September 27th,
2018].
Ellyatt, Holly: Saudi Arabia and Iran!s Feud has entered a new "unpredictable! phase,
available here: https://www.cnbc.com/2017/12/20/saudi-arabia-and-irans-conflict-in-
yemen.html [December 28th, 2017].
Laub, Zachary: Yemen in Crisis, April 19, 2016, availabel here: https://www.cfr.org/
backgrounder/yemen-crisis [December 27th, 2017].
Lippman, Thomas W.: “The Day FDR met Saudi Arabia!s Ibn Sa!ud”, in: The Link 38ii
(2005), available here: https://www.ouramazingworld.org/uploads/4/3/8/6/43860587/
vol38_issue2_2005.pdf [December 28th, 2017].
The Saudi Cables. Cables and other documents from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, available here: https://wikileaks.org/saudi-cables/ [De-
cember 30th, 2017].
Rüdiger Lohlker, Oriental Institute, Faculty for Philological and Cultural Studies, Uni-
versity of Vienna, Austria, e-mail: ruediger.lohlker@univie.ac.at
Citation: Lohlker, Rüdiger: “Representation with/out Representation: SaudiaArabia as
a Hidden Face of Globalization”, in: Appel, Kurt / Raschke, Carl (eds.): The Crisis of
Representation (J-RaT 2018 / 2) pp. 110–123.
Datum der Publikation: 21.01.2019
123
Saudia Arabia as a Hidden Face of Globalization
Interdisciplinary Journal for Religion and Transformation (2018), Heft 7, doi.org/10.14220/jrat.2018.4.issue-2
Open-Access-Publikation im Sinne der CC-Lizenz BY-NC-ND 4.0 
(https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/)
